Certificate size reduction in Abstraction-Carrying Code by Albert, Elvira et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
01
0.
45
33
v1
  [
cs
.PL
]  
13
 O
ct 
20
10
Under consideration for publication in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming 1
Certificate Size Reduction in
Abstraction-Carrying Code∗
ELVIRA ALBERT, PURI ARENAS
School of Computer Science, Complutense University of Madrid
E28040-Profesor Jose´ Garc´ıa Santesmases, s/n, Madrid, Spain
(e-mail: {elvira,puri}@sip.ucm.es)
GERMA´N PUEBLA1, MANUEL HERMENEGILDO1,2
1 School of Computer Science, Technical University of Madrid
E28660-Boadilla del Monte, Madrid, Spain
(e-mail: {german,herme}@fi.upm.es)
2 Madrid Institute for Advanced Studies
in Software Development Technology (IMDEA Software)
Madrid,Spain
(e-mail: manuel.hermenegildo@imdea.org)
submitted 19 September 2007; revised 16 Octorer 2009; 27 May 2010; accepted 6 October 2010
Abstract
Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) has recently been proposed as a framework for mobile
code safety in which the code supplier provides a program together with an abstraction
(or abstract model of the program) whose validity entails compliance with a predefined
safety policy. The abstraction plays thus the role of safety certificate and its generation
is carried out automatically by a fixpoint analyzer. The advantage of providing a (fix-
point) abstraction to the code consumer is that its validity is checked in a single pass
(i.e., one iteration) of an abstract interpretation-based checker. A main challenge to make
ACC useful in practice is to reduce the size of certificates as much as possible while at
the same time not increasing checking time. The intuitive idea is to only include in the
certificate information that the checker is unable to reproduce without iterating. We in-
troduce the notion of reduced certificate which characterizes the subset of the abstraction
which a checker needs in order to validate (and re-construct) the full certificate in a single
pass. Based on this notion, we instrument a generic analysis algorithm with the necessary
extensions in order to identify the information relevant to the checker. Interestingly, the
fact that the reduced certificate omits (parts of) the abstraction has implications in the
design of the checker. We provide the sufficient conditions which allow us to ensure that
1) if the checker succeeds in validating the certificate, then the certificate is valid for the
program (correctness) and 2) the checker will succeed for any reduced certificate which is
valid (completeness). Our approach has been implemented and benchmarked within the
CiaoPP system. The experimental results show that our proposal is able to greatly reduce
the size of certificates in practice.
To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP).
KEYWORDS: Proof-Carrying Code. Abstraction-Carrying Code. Static Analysis. Re-
duced Certificates.
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1 Introduction
Proof-Carrying Code (PCC) (Necula 1997) is a general framework for mobile code
safety which proposes to associate safety information in the form of a certificate
to programs. The certificate (or proof) is created at compile time by the certifier
on the code supplier side, and it is packaged along with the code. The consumer
which receives or downloads the (untrusted) code+certificate package can then run
a checker which by an efficient inspection of the code and the certificate can verify
the validity of the certificate and thus compliance with the safety policy. The key
benefit of this “certificate-based” approach to mobile code safety is that the task
of the consumer is reduced from the level of proving to the level of checking, a
procedure that should be much simpler, efficient, and automatic than generating
the original certificate.
Abstraction-Carrying Code (ACC) (Albert et al. 2005; Albert et al. 2008) has
been recently proposed as an enabling technology for PCC in which an abstrac-
tion (or abstract model of the program) plays the role of certificate. An important
feature of ACC is that not only the checking, but also the generation of the ab-
straction, is carried out automatically by a fixpoint analyzer. In this article we will
consider analyzers which construct a program analysis graph which is interpreted as
an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of states explored by the concrete exe-
cution. To capture the different graph traversal strategies used in different fixpoint
algorithms, we use the generic description of (Hermenegildo et al. 2000), which
generalizes the algorithms used in state-of-the-art analysis engines.
Essentially, the certification/analysis carried out by the supplier is an iterative
process which repeatedly traverses the analysis graph until a fixpoint is reached.
The analysis information inferred for each call which appears during the (multiple)
graph traversals is stored in the answer table (Hermenegildo et al. 2000). After each
iteration (or graph traversal), if the answer computed for a certain call is different
from the one previously stored in the answer table, both answers are combined (by
computing their lub) and the result is used 1) to update the table, and 2) to launch
the recomputation of those calls whose answer depends on the answer currently
computed. In the original ACC framework, the final full answer table constitutes
the certificate. A main idea is that, since this certificate contains the fixpoint, a
single pass over the analysis graph is sufficient to validate such certificate on the
consumer side.
One of the main challenges for the practical uptake of ACC (and related methods)
is to produce certificates which are reasonably small. This is important since the
certificate is transmitted together with the untrusted code and, hence, reducing its
size will presumably contribute to a smaller transmission time –very relevant for in-
stance under limited bandwidth and/or expensive network connectivity conditions.
Also, this reduces the storage cost for the certificate. Nevertheless, a main con-
cern when reducing the size of the certificate is that checking time is not increased
(among other reasons because pervasive and embedded systems also suffer typically
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from limited computing –and power– resources). In principle, the consumer could
use an analyzer for the purpose of generating the whole fixpoint from scratch, which
is still feasible as analysis is automatic. However, this would defeat one of the main
purposes of ACC, which is to reduce checking time. The objective of this work is
to characterize the smallest subset of the abstraction which must be sent within a
certificate –and which still guarantees a single pass checking process– and to design
an ACC scheme which generates and validates such reduced certificates. The main
contributions of this article are:
1. The notion of reduced certificate which characterizes the subset of the abstrac-
tion which, for a given analysis graph traversal strategy, the checker needs in
order to validate (and re-construct) the full certificate in a single pass.
2. An instrumentation of the generic abstract interpretation-based analysis al-
gorithm of (Hermenegildo et al. 2000) with the necessary extensions in order
to identify relevant information to the checker.
3. A checker for reduced certificates which is correct, i.e., if the checker succeeds
in validating the certificate, then the certificate is valid for the program.
4. Sufficient conditions for ensuring completeness of the checking process. Con-
cretely, if the checker uses the same strategy as the analyzer then our proposed
checker will succeed for any reduced certificate which is valid.
5. An experimental evaluation of the effect of our approach on the CiaoPP system
(Hermenegildo et al. 2005), the abstract interpretation-based preprocessor of
the Ciao multi-paradigm (Constraint) Logic Programming system. The ex-
perimental results show that the certificate can be greatly reduced (by a factor
of 3.35) with no increase in checking time.
Both the ACC framework and our work here are applied at the source level. In
contrast, in existing PCC frameworks, the code supplier typically packages the cer-
tificate with the object code rather than with the source code (both are untrusted).
Nevertheless, our choice of making our presentation at the source level is without
loss of generality because both the original ideas in the ACC approach and those in
our current proposal can also be applied directly to bytecode. Indeed, a good num-
ber of abstract interpretation-based analyses have been proposed in the literature
for bytecode and machine code, most of which compute a fixpoint during analysis
which can be reduced using the general principle of our proposal. For instance, in
recent work, the concrete CLP verifier used in the original ACC implementation
has itself been shown to be applicable without modification also to Java bytecode
via a transformational approach, based on partial evaluation (Albert et al. 2007) or
via direct transformation (Me´ndez-Lojo et al. 2007a) using standard tools such as
Soot (Vallee-Rai et al. 1999). Furthermore, in (Me´ndez-Lojo et al. 2007b; Me´ndez-Lojo et al. 2007a)
a fixpoint-based analysis framework has been developed specifically for Java byte-
code which is essentially equivalent to that used in the ACC proposal and to the one
that we will apply in this work on the producer side to perform the analysis and ver-
ification. This supports the direct applicability of our approach to bytecode-based
program representations and, in general, to other languages and paradigms.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The following section presents a
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general view of ACC. Section 3 gives a brief overview of our method by means
of a simple example. Section 4 recalls the certification process performed by the
code supplier and illustrates it with a running example. Section 5 characterizes the
notion of reduced certificate and instruments a generic certifier for its generation.
Section 6 presents a generic checker for reduced certificates together with correctness
and completeness results. Finally, Section 7 discusses some experimental results and
related work.
2 A General View of Abstraction-Carrying Code
We assume the reader familiar with abstract interpretation (see (Cousot and Cousot 1977))
and (Constraint) Logic Programming (C)LP (see, e.g., (Marriot and Stuckey 1998)
and (Lloyd 1987)).
An abstract interpretation-based certifier is a function certifier : Prog ×ADom ×
APol 7→ ACert which for a given program P ∈ Prog , an abstract domain 〈Dα,⊑〉 ∈
ADom and a safety policy Iα ∈ APol generates a certificate Certα ∈ ACert ,
by using an abstract interpreter for Dα, which entails that P satisfies Iα. In the
following, we denote that Iα and Certα are specifications given as abstract semantic
values of Dα by using the same α. The essential idea in the certification process
carried out in ACC is that a fixpoint static analyzer is used to automatically infer
an abstract model (or simply abstraction) about the mobile code which can then
be used to prove that the code is safe w.r.t. the given policy in a straightforward
way. The basics for defining the abstract interpretation-based certifiers in ACC are
summarized in the following four points and equations.
Approximation. We consider a description (or abstract) domain 〈Dα,⊑〉 ∈ ADom
and its corresponding concrete domain 〈2D,⊆〉, both with a complete lattice
structure. Description (or abstract) values and sets of concrete values are re-
lated by an abstraction function α : 2D → Dα, and a concretization function
γ : Dα → 2D. The pair 〈α, γ〉 forms a Galois connection. The concrete and
abstract domains must be related in such a way that the following condition
holds (Cousot and Cousot 1977):
∀x∈2D, ∀y∈Dα : (α(x) ⊑ y)⇐⇒ (x ⊆ γ(y))
In general ⊑ is induced by ⊆ and α. Similarly, the operations of least upper bound
(⊔) and greatest lower bound (⊓) mimic those of 2D in a precise sense.
Abstraction generation. We consider the class of fixpoint semantics in which a
(monotonic) semantic operator, SP , is associated to each program P . The mean-
ing of the program, [[P ]], is defined as the least fixed point of the SP operator,
i.e., [[P ]]=lfp(SP ). If SP is continuous, the least fixed point is the limit of an it-
erative process involving at most ω applications of SP starting from the bottom
element of the lattice. Using abstract interpretation, we can use an operator SαP
which works in the abstract domain and which is the abstract counterpart of
SP . This operator induces the abstract meaning of the program, which we refer
to as [[P ]]α. Now, again, starting from the bottom element of the lattice we can
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obtain the least fixpoint of SαP , denoted lfp(S
α
P ), and we define [[P ]]α=lfp(S
α
P ).
Correctness of analysis (Cousot and Cousot 1977) ensures that [[P ]]α safely ap-
proximates [[P ]], i.e., [[P ]] ∈ γ([[P ]]α). In actual analyzers, it is often the case that
the analysis computes a post-fixpoint of SαP , which we refer to as Certα, instead
of the least fixpoint. The reason for this is that computing the least fixpoint may
require a too large (even infinite) number of iterations. An analyzer is a function
analyzer : Prog ×ADom 7→ ACert such that:
analyzer(P,Dα)=Certα ∧ S
α
P (Certα)=Certα (1)
Since [[P ]]α ⊑ Certα, Certα is a safe approximation of [[P ]].
Verification Condition. Let Certα be a safe approximation of [[P ]]. If an ab-
stract safety specification Iα can be proved w.r.t. Certα, then P satisfies the
safety policy and Certα is a valid certificate:
Certα is a valid certificate for P w.r.t. Iα if Certα ⊑ Iα (2)
Certification. Together, Equations (1) and (2) define a certifier which provides
program fixpoints, Certα, as certificates which entail a given safety policy, i.e.,
by taking Certα = analyzer(P,Dα).
The second main idea in ACC is that a simple, easy-to-trust abstract interpretation-
based checker verifies the validity of the abstraction on the mobile code. The checker
is defined as a specialized abstract interpreter whose key characteristic is that it
does not need to iterate in order to reach a fixpoint (in contrast to standard ana-
lyzers). The basics for defining the abstract interpretation-based checkers in ACC
are summarized in the following two points and equations.
Checking. If a certificate Certα is a fixpoint of S
α
P , then S
α
P (Certα) = Certα.
Thus, a checker is a function checker : Prog ×ADom ×ACert 7→ bool which for a
program P∈Prog, an abstract domainDα∈ADom and a certificate Certα∈ACert
checks whether Certα is a fixpoint of S
α
P or not:
checker(P,Dα, Certα) returns true iff (S
α
P (Certα) = Certα) (3)
Verification Condition Regeneration. To retain the safety guarantees, the con-
sumer must regenerate a trustworthy verification condition –Equation 2– and use
the incoming certificate to test for adherence to the safety policy.
P is trusted iff Certα ⊑ Iα (4)
Therefore, the general idea in ACC is that, while analysis –Equation (1)– is an
iterative process, which may traverse (parts of) the abstraction more than once
until the fixpoint is reached, checking –Equation (3)– is guaranteed to be done in
a single pass over the abstraction. This characterization of checking ensures that
the task performed by the consumers is indeed strictly more efficient than the
certification carried out by the producers, as shown in (Albert et al. 2005).
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3 An Informal Account of our Method
In this section we provide an informal account of the idea of reduced certificate
within the ACC framework by means of a very simple example.
Example 3.1
Consider the following program, the simple abstract domain ⊥ ⊑ int ⊑ real ⊑
term that we will use in all our examples, and the initial calling pattern Sα =
{q(X):〈term〉} which indicates that q can be called with any term as argument:
q(X) :- p(X). p(X) :- X = 1.0.
p(X) :- X = 1.
A (top-down) analyzer for logic programs would start the analysis of q(term) which
in turn requires the analysis of p(term) and, as a result, the following fixpoint can
be inferred: Certα = {q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉, p(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉}. This gives us
a safe approximation of the result of executing q(X). In particular, it says that
we obtain a real number as a result of executing q(X). Observe that the fixpoint
is sound but possibly inaccurate since when only the second rule defining p(X) is
executed, we would obtain an integer number.
Given a safety policy, the next step in any approach to PCC is to verify that
Certα entails such policy. For instance, if the safety policy specifies that Iα =
{q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈term〉}, then clearly Certα ⊑ Iα holds and, hence, Certα can be
used as a certificate. Similarly, a safety policy I ′α = {q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉} is
entailed by the certificate, while I ′′α = {q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈int〉} is not.
The next important idea in ACC is that, given a valid certificate Certα, a single
pass of a static analyzer over it must not change the result and, hence, this way
Certα can be validated. Observe that when analyzing the second rule of p(X) the
inferred information X 7→ int is lubbed with X 7→ real which we have in the
certificate and, hence, the fixpoint does not change. Therefore, the checker can be
implemented as a non-iterating single-pass analyzer over the certificate. If the result
of applying the checker to Certα yields a result that is different from Certα an error
is issued. Once the checker has verified that Certα is a fixpoint (and thus it safely
approximates the program semantics) the only thing left is to verify that Certα
entails Iα, thus ensuring that the validated certificate enforces the safety policy,
exactly as the certifier does.
We now turn to the key idea of reduced certificates in ACC: the observation
that any information in the certificate that the checker is able to reconstruct by
itself in a single-pass does not need to be included in the certificate. For example, if
generation of the certificate does not require iteration, then no information needs to
be included in the certificate, since by performing the same steps as the generator
the checker will not iterate. If the generator does need to iterate, then the challenge
is to find the minimal amount of information that needs to be included in Certα
to avoid such iteration in the checker.
Whether a generator requires iteration depends on the strategy used when com-
puting the fixpoint as well as on the domain and the program itself (presence of
loops and recursions, multivariance, etc.). In fact, much work has been done in
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order to devise optimized strategies to reduce as much as possible iterations dur-
ing analysis. As mentioned before, (Hermenegildo et al. 2000), which will be our
starting point, presents a parametric algorithm that allows capturing a large class
of such strategies. An important observation is that whether the checker can avoid
iteration is controlled by the same factors as in the generator, modified only by the
effects of the information included in the (reduced) certificate, that we would like
to be minimal.
As an (oversimplied) example in order to explain this idea, let us consider two
possible fixpoint strategies, each one used equally in both the analyzer (generator)
and the checker:
(1) a strategy which first analyzes the first rule for p(X) and then the second one,
and
(2) a strategy which analyzes the rules in the opposite order than (1).
Assume also that the analyzer has the simple iteration rule that as soon as an answer
changes during analysis then analysis is restarted at the top (these strategies are
really too simple and no practical analyzer would really iterate on this example,
but they are useful for illustration here –the general issue of strategies will become
clear later in the paper).
In (1), the answer X 7→ real is inferred after the checking of the first rule. Then,
the second rule is analyzed which leads to the answer X 7→ int that is lubbed with
the previous one yielding X 7→ real. Hence, in a single pass over the program the
fixpoint is reached. Therefore, with this strategy X 7→ real can be reconstructed
by the checker without iterating and should not be included in the certificate.
However, with strategy (2) we first obtain the answer X 7→ int. Then, after the
analysis of the first rule, X 7→ real is inferred. When lubbing it with the previous
value, X 7→ int, the answer obtained is X 7→ real. Since the answer has changed
the analyzer starts a new iteration in which it reanalyzes the second rule with the
new answer X 7→ real. Since now nothing changes in this iteration the fixpoint is
reached.
The key idea is that, if strategy (2) is used, then more than one iteration is
needed to reach the fixpoint. Hence the certificate cannot be empty and instead it
has to include (some of) the analysis information. The conclusion is that the notion
of reduced certificate is strongly related to the strategy used during analysis and
checking. ✷
The remainder of the article will formalize and discuss in detail each of the above
steps and issues.
4 Generation of Certificates in Abstraction-Carrying Code
This section recalls ACC and the notion of full certificate in the context of (C)LP
(Albert et al. 2005). This programming paradigm offers a good number of advan-
tages for ACC, an important one being the maturity and sophistication of the
analysis tools available for it. It is also a non-trivial case in many ways, including
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the fact that logic variables and incomplete data structures essentially represent re-
spectively pointers and structures containing pointers (see also the arguments and
pointers to literature in Section 1 which provide evidence that our approach is ap-
plicable essentially directly to programs in other programming paradigms, including
their bytecode representations).
Very briefly, terms are constructed from variables x ∈ V , functors (e.g., f) and
predicates (e.g., p). We denote by {x1/t1, . . . , xn/tn} the substitution σ, where xi 6=
xj , if i 6= j, and ti are terms. A renaming is a substitution ρ for which there
exists the inverse ρ−1 such that ρρ−1 ≡ ρ−1ρ ≡ id . A constraint is a conjunction
of expressions built from predefined predicates (such as inequalities over the reals)
whose arguments are constructed using predefined functions (such as real addition).
An atom has the form p(t1, ..., tn) where p is a predicate symbol and ti are terms.
A literal is either an atom or a constraint. A rule is of the form H:-D where H ,
the head, is an atom and D, the body, is a possibly empty finite sequence of literals.
A constraint logic program P ∈ Prog , or program, is a finite set of rules. Program
rules are assumed to be normalized: only distinct variables are allowed to occur as
arguments to atoms. Furthermore, we require that each rule defining a predicate p
has identical sequence of variables xp1 , . . . xpn in the head atom, i.e., p(xp1 , . . . xpn).
We call this the base form of p. This is not restrictive since programs can always
be normalized.
4.1 The Analysis Algorithm
Algorithm 1 has been presented in (Hermenegildo et al. 2000) as a generic de-
scription of a fixpoint algorithm which generalizes those used in state-of-the-art
analysis engines, such as the one in CiaoPP (Hermenegildo et al. 2005), PLAI (Muthukumar and Hermenegildo 1992;
de la Banda et al. 1996), GAIA (Le Charlier and Van Hentenryck 1994), and the
CLP(R) analyzer (Kelly et al. 1998). It has the description domain Dα (and func-
tions on this domain) as parameters. Different domains give analyzers which provide
different kinds of information and degrees of accuracy. In order to analyze a pro-
gram, traditional (goal dependent) abstract interpreters for (C)LP programs receive
as input, in addition to the program P and the abstract domain Dα, a set Sα ⊆ AA-
tom of Abstract Atoms (or call patterns). Such call patterns are pairs of the form
A : CP where A is a procedure descriptor and CP is an abstract substitution (i.e.,
a condition of the run-time bindings) of A expressed as CP ∈ Dα. For brevity, we
sometimes omit the subscript α in the algorithms. The analyzer of Algorithm 1,
Analyze f, constructs an and–or graph (Bruynooghe 1991) (or analysis graph) for
Sα which is an abstraction of the (possibly infinite) set of (possibly infinite) exe-
cution paths (and-or trees) explored by the concrete execution of the initial calls
described by Sα in P . Let S
α
P be the abstract semantics of the program for the call
patterns Sα defined in (Bruynooghe 1991). Following the notation in Section 2, the
analysis graph –denoted as [[P ]]α– corresponds to (or safely approximates) lfp(S
α
P ).
The program analysis graph is implicitly represented in the algorithm by means
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Algorithm 1 Generic Analyzer for Abstraction-Carrying Code
Initialization of global data structures: DAT=AT=∅
1: function Analyze f(Sα ⊆ AAtom ,Ω ∈ QHS)
2: for A : CP ∈ Sα do
3: add event(newcall(A : CP),Ω);
4: while E=next event(Ω) do
5: if E=newcall(A : CP) then new call pattern(A : CP,Ω);
6: else if E=updated (A : CP) then add dependent rules(A : CP,Ω);
7: else if E=arc(R) then process arc(R,Ω);
8: return AT;
9: procedure new call pattern(A : CP ∈ AAtom ,Ω ∈ QHS)
10: for all rule Ak : −Bk,1, . . . , Bk,nk do
11: CP0 :=Aextend(CP, vars(. . . , Bk,i, . . .));
12: CP1 := Arestrict(CP0, vars(Bk,1));
13: add event(arc(Ak : CP⇒ [CP0] Bk,1 : CP1),Ω);
14: add answer table(A : CP7→⊥);
15: procedure process arc(Hk : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2 ∈ Dep, Ω ∈ QHS)
16: if Bk,i is not a constraint then
17: add Hk : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2 to DAT ;
18: W := vars(Hk, Bk,1, . . . , Bk,nk );
19: CP3 := get answer(Bk,i : CP2,CP1,W,Ω);
20: if CP3 6= ⊥ and i 6= nk then
21: CP4 := Arestrict(CP3, vars(Bk,i+1));
22: add event( arc(Hk : CP0 ⇒ [CP3] Bk,i+1 : CP4),Ω);
23: else if CP3 6= ⊥ and i=nk then
24: AP1 := Arestrict(CP3, vars(Hk)); insert answer info(H : CP0 7→AP1,Ω);
25: function get answer(L : CP2 ∈ AAtom,CP1 ∈ Dα,W ⊆ V,Ω ∈ QHS)
26: if L is a constraint then return Aadd(L,CP1);
27: else AP0 := lookup answer(L : CP2,Ω); AP1 := Aextend(AP0,W );
28: return Aconj(CP1,AP1);
29: function lookup answer(A : CP ∈ AAtom ,Ω ∈ QHS)
30: if there exists a renaming σ s.t. σ(A : CP) 7→AP in AT then
31: return σ−1(AP);
32: else add event(newcall(σ(A : CP)),Ω) where σ is renaming s.t. σ(A) in base form;
33: return ⊥;
34: procedure insert answer info(H : CP7→AP ∈ Entry ,Ω ∈ QHS)
35: AP0 := lookup answer(H : CP); AP1 := Alub(AP,AP0);
36: if AP0 6= AP1 then
37: add answer table((H : CP7→AP1);
38: add event(updated(H : CP),Ω);
39: procedure add dependent rules(A : CP ∈ AAtom,Ω ∈ QHS)
40: for all arc of the form Hk : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2 in graph where there exists
renaming σ s.t. A : CP=(Bk,i : CP2)σ do
41: add event(arc(Hk : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2),Ω);
of two global data structures, the answer table AT and the dependency arc table
DAT , both initially empty as shown at the beginning of Algorithm 1.1
1 Given the information in these, it is straightforward to construct the graph and the associated
program-point annotations.
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Definition 4.1 (answer and dependency arc table)
Let P ∈ Prog be a program and Dα an abstract domain.
• An Answer Table (AT ⊆ Entry) for P and Dα is a set of entries of the form
A : CP 7→AP ∈ Entry where A : CP ∈ AAtom , A is always in base form and
CP and AP are abstract substitutions in Dα.
• A Dependency Arc Table (DAT ⊆ Dep) for P and Dα is a set of dependencies
of the form Ak : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2 ∈ Dep, where Ak :- Bk,1, . . . , Bk,n
is a program rule in P and CP0,CP1,CP2 are abstract substitutions in Dα.
Informally, an entry A : CP 7→ AP in AT should be interpreted as “the answer
pattern for calls to A satisfying precondition (or call pattern) CP meets post-
condition (or answer pattern), AP.” Dependencies are used for efficiency. As we
will explain later, Algorithm 1 finishes when there are no more events to be pro-
cessed (function Analyze f). This happens when the answer table AT reaches
a fixpoint. Any entry A : CP 7→ AP in AT is generated by analyzing all rules
associated to A (procedure new call pattern). Thus, if we have a rule of the
form Ak :- Bk,1, . . . , Bk,n, we know that the answer for A depends on the answers
for all literals in the body of the rule. We annotate this fact in DAT by means
of the dependencies Ak : CP ⇒ [CPk,i−1] Bk,i : CPk,i, i ∈ {1, ..n}, which mean
that the answer for Ak : CP depends on the answer for Bk,i : CPk,i, also stored
in AT . Then if during the analysis, the answer for Bk,i : CPk,i changes, the arc
Ak : CP ⇒ [CPk,i−1]Bk,i : CPk,i must be reprocessed in order to compute the
“possibly” new answer for Ak : CP . This is to say that the rule for Ak has to be
processed again starting from atom Bk,i. Thus, as we will see later, dependency
arcs are used for forcing recomputation until a fixpoint is reached. The remaining
part CPk,i−1 is the program annotation just before Bk,i is reached and contains
information about all variables in rule k. CPk,i−1 is not really necessary, but is
included for efficiency.
Intuitively, the analysis algorithm is a graph traversal algorithm which places
entries in the answer table AT and dependency arc table DAT as new nodes and
arcs in the program analysis graph are encountered. To capture the different graph
traversal strategies used in different fixpoint algorithms, a prioritized event queue
is used. We use Ω ∈ QHS to refer to a Queue Handling Strategy which a particular
instance of the generic algorithm may use. Events are of three forms:
• newcall (A : CP) which indicates that a new call pattern for literal A with
abstract substitution CP has been encountered.
• arc(Hk : ⇒ [ ] Bk,i : ) which indicates that the rule with Hk as head
needs to be (re)computed from the position k, i.
• updated(A : CP) which indicates that the answer to call pattern A with
abstract substitution CP has been changed in AT .
The algorithm is defined in terms of five abstract operations on the domain Dα:
• Arestrict(CP, V ) performs the abstract restriction of an abstract substitution
CP to the set of variables in the set V .
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• Aextend(CP, V ) extends the abstract substitution CP to the variables in the
set V .
• Aadd(C,CP) performs the abstract operation of conjoining the actual con-
straint C with the abstract substitution CP.
• Aconj(CP1,CP2) performs the abstract conjunction of two abstract substitu-
tions.
• Alub(CP1,CP2) performs the abstract disjunction of two abstract substitu-
tions.
Apart from the parametric domain-dependent functions, the algorithm has several
other undefined functions. The functions add event and next event respectively push
an event to the priority queue and pop the event of highest priority, according to
Ω. When an arc Hk : CP ⇒ [CP′′] Bk,i : CP′ is added to DAT , it replaces any
other arc of the form Hk : CP ⇒ [ ] Bk,i : (modulo renaming) in the table
and the priority queue. Similarly when an entry Hk : CP 7→ AP is added to the
AT (add answer table), it replaces any entry of the form Hk : CP 7→ (modulo
renaming). Note that the underscore ( ) matches any description, and that there is
at most one matching entry in DAT or AT at any time.
More details on the algorithm can be found in (Hermenegildo et al. 2000; Puebla and Hermenegildo 1996).
Let us briefly explain its main procedures:
• The algorithm centers around the processing of events on the priority queue,
which repeatedly removes the highest priority event (Line 4) and calls the
appropriate event-handling function (L5-7).
• The function new call pattern initiates processing of all the rules for the
definition of the internal literal A, by adding arc events for each of the first
literals of these rules (L13). Initially, the answer for the call pattern is set to
⊥ (L14).
• The procedure process arc performs the core of the analysis. It performs a
single step of the left-to-right traversal of a rule body.
— If the literal Bk,i is not a constraint (L16), the arc is added to DAT
(L17).
— Atoms are processed by function get answer:
– Constraints are simply added to the current description (L26).
– In the case of literals, the function lookup answer first looks up
an answer for the given call pattern in AT (L30) and if it is not
found, it places a newcall event (L32). When it finds one, then this
answer is extended to the variables in the rule the literal occurs
in (L27) and conjoined with the current abstract substitution (L28).
The resulting answer (L19) is either used to generate a new arc event
to process the next literal in the rule, if Bk,i is not the last one (L20);
otherwise, the new answer is computed by insert answer info.
• The part of the algorithm that is more relevant to the generation of reduced
certificates is within insert answer info. The new answer for the rule is
combined with the current answer in the table (L35). If the fixpoint for such
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call has not been reached, then the corresponding entry in AT is updated
with the combined answer (L37) and an updated event is added to the queue
(L38).
• The purpose of an updated event is that the function add dependent rules
(re)processes those calls which depend on the call pattern A : CP whose
answer has been updated (L40). This effect is achieved by adding the arc
events for each of its dependencies (L41). The fact that dependency arcs
contain information at the level of body literals, identified by a pair k, i,
allows reprocessing only those rules for the predicate which depend on the
updated pattern. Furthermore, those rules are reprocessed precisely from the
body atom whose answer has been updated. If, instead, dependencies were
kept at the level of rules, rules would need to be reprocessed always from
the leftmost atom. Furthermore, if dependencies were kept at the level of
predicates, all rules for a predicate would have to be reprocessed from the
leftmost atom as soon as an answer pattern it depended on were updated.
In the following section, we illustrate the algorithm by means of an example.
4.2 Running Example
Our running example is the program rectoy taken from (Rose 1998). We will use
it to illustrate our algorithms and show that our approach improves on state-of-
the-art techniques for reducing the size of certificates. Our approach can deal with
the very wide class of properties for which abstract interpretation has been proved
useful (for example in the context of LP this includes variable sharing, determi-
nacy, non-failure, termination, term size, etc.). For brevity and concreteness, in all
our examples abstract substitutions simply assign an abstract value in the simple
domain introduced in Section 3 to each variable in a set V over which each such
substitution ranges. We use term as the most general type (i.e., term corresponds
to all possible terms). For brevity, variables whose regular type is term are often
not shown in abstract substitutions. Also, when it is clear from the context, an ab-
stract substitution for an atom p(x1, . . . , xn) is shown as a tuple 〈t1, . . . , tn〉, such
that each value ti indicates the type of xi. The most general substitution ⊤ assigns
term to all variables in V . The least general substitution ⊥ assigns the empty set
of values to each variable.
Example 4.2
Consider the Ciao version of procedure rectoy (Rose 1998) and the call pattern
rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 which indicates that external calls to rectoy are per-
formed with an integer value, int, in the first argument N:
rectoy(N,M) :- N = 0, M = 0.
rectoy(N,M) :- N1 is N-1, rectoy(N1,R), M is N1+R.
We now briefly describe four main steps carried out in the analysis using some
Ω ∈ QHS :
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A. The initial event newcall(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉) introduces the arcs A1,1
and A2,1 in the queue, each one corresponds to the rules in the order above:
A1,1 ≡ arc(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 ⇒ [{N/int}] N=0 : {N/int})
A2,1 ≡ arc(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 ⇒ [{N/int}] N1 is N− 1 : {N/int})
The initial answer E1 ≡ rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 7→ ⊥ is inserted in AT .
B. Assume that Ω assigned higher priority to A1,1. The procedure get answer
simply adds the constraint N=0 to the abstract substitution {N/int}. Upon
return, as it is not the last body atom, the following arc event is generated:
A1,2 ≡ arc(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 ⇒ [{N/int}] M=0 : {M/term})
Arc A1,2 is handled exactly as A1,1 and get answer simply adds the con-
straint M=0, returning {N/int, M/int}. As it is the last atom in the body
(L23), procedure insert answer info computes Alub between ⊥ and the
above answer and overwrites E1 with:
E′1 ≡ rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 7→ 〈int, int〉
Therefore, the event U1 ≡ updated(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉) is introduced in
the queue. Note that no dependency has been originated during the processing
of this rule (as both body atoms are constraints).
C. Now, Ω can choose between the processing of U1 or A2,1. Let us assume that
A2,1 has higher priority. For its processing, we have to assume that prede-
fined functions “−”, “+” and “is” are dealt by the algorithm as standard
constraints by just using the following information provided by the system:
E2 ≡ C is A+ B : 〈int, int, term〉 7→ 〈int, int, int〉
E3 ≡ C is A− B : 〈int, int, term〉 7→ 〈int, int, int〉
where the three values in the abstract substitutions correspond to variables
A, B, and C, in this order. In particular, after analyzing the subtraction with
the initial call pattern, we infer that N1 is of type int and no dependency is
asserted. Next, the arc:
A2,2 ≡ arc(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 ⇒
[{N/int, N1/int}] rectoy(N1, R) : 〈int, term〉)
is introduced in the queue and the corresponding dependency is stored in
DAT . The call to get answer returns the current answer E′1. Then, we use
this answer as call pattern to process the last addition by creating a new arc
A2,3.
A2,3 ≡ arc(rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 ⇒
[{N/int, N1/int, R/int}] M is N1+ R : {N1/int, R/int})
Clearly, the processing of A2,3 does not change the final answer E
′
1. Hence,
no more updates are introduced in the queue.
D. Finally, we have to process the event U1 introduced in step B to which Ω
has assigned lowest priority. The procedure add dependent rules finds the
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Fig. 1. Analysis Graph for our Running Example
dependency corresponding to arc A2,2 and inserts it in the queue. This re-
launches an arc identical to A2,2. This in turn launches an arc identical to
A2,3. However, the reprocessing does not change the fixpoint result E
′
1 and
the analysis terminates computing as answer table the entry E′1 and as unique
dependency arc A2,2.
Figure 1 shows the analysis graph for the analysis above. The graph has two sorts
of nodes. Those which correspond to atoms are called “OR-nodes.” An OR-node
of the form CPAAP is interpreted as: the answer for the call pattern A : CP is AP.
For instance, the OR-node
{N1/int}rectoy(N1, R){N1/int,R/int}
indicates that, when the atom rectoy(N1, R) is called with the abstract substitution
〈int, term〉, the answer computed is 〈int, int〉. As mentioned before, variables
whose type is term will often not be shown in what follows. Those nodes which
correspond to rules are called “AND-nodes.” In Figure 1, they appear within a
dotted box and contain the head of the corresponding clause. Each AND-node has
as children as many OR-nodes as there are atoms in the body. If a child OR-node
is already in the tree, it is not expanded any further and the currently available
answer is used. For instance, the analysis graph in the figure at hand contains two
occurrences of the abstract atom rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 (modulo renaming),
but only one of them (the root) has been expanded. This is depicted by a dashed
arrow from the non-expanded occurrence to the expanded one.
The answer table AT contains entries for the different OR-nodes which appear
in the graph. In our example AT contains E′1 associated to the (root) OR-node
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discussed above. Dependencies in DAT indicate direct relations among OR-nodes.
An OR-node AF : CPF depends on another OR-node AT : CPT iff the OR-
node AT : CPT appears in the body of some clause for AF : CPF . For instance,
the dependency A2,2 indicates that the OR-node rectoy(N1, R) : 〈int, term〉 is
used in the OR-node rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉. Thus, if the answer pattern for
rectoy(N1, R) : 〈int, term〉 is ever updated, then we must reprocess the OR-node
rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉. ✷
4.3 Full Certificate
The following definition corresponds to the essential idea in the ACC framework
–Equations (1) and (2)– of using a static analyzer to generate the certificates. The
analyzer corresponds to Algorithm 1 and the certificate is the full answer table.
Definition 4.3 (full certificate)
We define function Certifier f : Prog×ADom×2AAtom ×APol×QHS 7→ ACert
which takes P ∈ Prog, Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol , Ω ∈ QHS and
returns as full certificate, FCert ∈ ACert , the answer table computed by Analy-
ze f(Sα,Ω) for P in Dα iff FCert ⊑ Iα.
If the inclusion does not hold, we do not have a certificate. This can happen either
because the program does not satisfy the policy or because the analyzer is not
precise enough. In the latter case, a solution is to try analyzing with a more precise
(and generally more expensive) abstract domain. In the former case (the program
does not satisfy the policy), this can be due to two possible reasons. A first one is
that we have formalized a policy which is unnecessarily restrictive, in which case
the solution is to weaken it. The other possible reason is that the program actually
violates the policy, either inadvertently or on purpose. In such a case there is of
course no way a certificate can be found for such program and policy.
Example 4.4
Consider the safety policy expressed by the following specification Iα : rectoy(N, M) :
〈int, term〉7→〈int, real〉. The certifier in Definition 4.3 returns as valid certificate
the single entry E′1. Clearly E
′
1 ⊑ Iα since ⊥ ⊑ int ⊑ real ⊑ term. ✷
5 Abstraction-Carrying Code with Reduced Certificates
As already mentioned in Section 1, in the ACC framework, since this certificate
contains the fixpoint, a single pass over the analysis graph is sufficient to validate
such certificate on the consumer side. The key observation in order to reduce the
size of certificates within the ACC framework is that certain entries in a certifi-
cate may be irrelevant, in the sense that the checker is able to reproduce them
by itself in a single pass. The notion of relevance is directly related to the idea
of recomputation in the program analysis graph. Intuitively, given an entry in the
answer table A : CP 7→ AP , its fixpoint may have been computed in several iter-
ations from ⊥, AP0, AP1, . . . until AP . For each change in the answer, an event
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updated(A : CP) is generated during the analysis. The above entry is relevant in
a certificate (under some strategy) when its updates launch the recomputation of
other arcs in the graph which depend on A : CP (i.e., there is a dependency from
it in the table). Thus, unless A : CP 7→ AP is included in the (reduced) certificate,
a single-pass checker which uses the same strategy as the code producer will not
be able to validate the certificate. Section 5.1 identifies redundant updates which
should not be considered. In Section 5.2, we characterize formally the notion of
reduced certificate containing only relevant answers. Then, in Section 5.3, we in-
strument an analysis algorithm to identify relevant answers and define a certifier
based on the instrumented analyzer which generates reduced certificates.
5.1 Identifying Redundant Updates
According to the above intuition, we are interested in determining when an entry
in the answer table has been “updated” during the analysis and such changes affect
other entries. There is a special kind of updated events which can be directly consid-
ered irrelevant and correspond to those updates which launch a redundant computa-
tion (like the U1 event generated in step B of Example 4.2). We write DAT |A:CP to
denote the set of arcs of the form H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ] B : CP2 ∈ Dep in the current
dependency arc table which depend on A : CP , i.e., such that A : CP = (B : CP2 )σ
for some renaming σ.
Definition 5.1 (redundant update)
Let P ∈ Prog , Sα ⊆ AAtom and Ω ∈ QHS . We say that an event updated(A : CP)
which appears in the prioritized event queue during the analysis of P for Sα is
redundant w.r.t. Ω if, when it is generated, DAT |A:CP = ∅.
It should be noted that redundant updates can only be generated by updated
events for call patterns which belong to Sα, i.e., to the initial set of call patterns.
Otherwise, DAT |A:CP cannot be empty. Let us explain the intuition of this. The
reason is that whenever an event updated(A : CP ), A : CP 6∈ Sα, is generated is
because a rule for A has been completely analyzed. Hence, a corresponding call to
insert answer info for A : CP (L24 in Algorithm 1) has been done. If such a rule
has been completely analyzed then all its arcs were introduced in the prioritized
event queue. Observe that the first time that an arc is introduced in the queue
is because a call to procedure new call pattern for A : CP occurred, i.e., a
newcall(A : CP ) event was analyzed. Consider the first event newcall for A : CP .
If A : CP 6∈ Sα, then this event originates from the analysis of some other arc of
the form H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1]A : CP for which A : CP has no entry in the answer
table. Thus, the dependency H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]A : CP was added to DAT . Since
dependencies are never removed fromDAT , then any later updated event for A : CP
occurs under the condition DAT |A:CP 6= ∅. Even if it is possible to fix the strategy
and define an analysis algorithm which does not introduce redundant updates, we
prefer to follow as much as possible the generic one.
Example 5.2
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In our running example U1 is redundant for Ω at the moment it is generated.
However, since the event has been given low priority its processing is delayed until
the end and, in the meantime, a dependency from it has been added. This causes
the unnecessary redundant recomputation of the second arc A2,2 for rectoy. ✷
Note that redundant updates are indeed events which if processed immediately
correspond to “nops”.
The following proposition ensures the correctness of using a queue handling strat-
egy which assigns the highest priority to redundant updates. This result can be
found in (Hermenegildo et al. 2000), where it is stated that Analyze f is correct
independently of the order in which events in the prioritized event queue are pro-
cessed.
Proposition 5.3
Let Ω ∈ QHS . Let Ω′ ∈ QHS be a strategy which assigns the highest priority to any
updated event which is redundant. Then, ∀ P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom,
Analyze f(Sα,Ω)=Analyze f(Sα,Ω
′).
5.2 The Notion of Reduced Certificate
As mentioned above, the notion of reduced certificate is directly related to the idea
of recomputation in the program analysis graph. Now, we are interested in finding
those entries A : CP ∈ Entry in the answer table, whose analysis has launched the
reprocessing of some arcs and hence recomputation has occurred. Certainly, the
reprocessing of an arc may only be caused by a non-redundant updated event for
A : CP , which inserted (via add dependent rules) all arcs in DAT |A:CP into
the prioritized event queue. However some updated events are not dangerous. For
instance, if the processing of an arc H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]A : CP has been stopped
because of the lack of answer for A : CP (L20 and L23 in Algorithm 1), this arc
must be considered as “suspended”, since its continuation has not been introduced
in the queue. In particular, we do not take into account updated events for A : CP
which are generated when DAT |A:CP only contains suspended arcs. Note that this
case still corresponds to the first traversal of any arc and should not be considered
as a reprocessing. The following definition introduces the notion of suspended arc,
i.e., of an arc suspended during analysis.
Definition 5.4 (suspended arc)
Let P ∈ Prog , Sα ⊆ AAtom and Ω ∈ QHS . We say that an arc H : CP0 ⇒
[CP1 ] B : CP2 in the dependency arc table is suspended w.r.t. Ω during the analysis
of P for Sα iff when it is generated, the answer table does not contain any entry
for B : CP2 or contains an entry of the form B : CP2 7→ ⊥.
For the rest of the updated events, their relevance depends strongly on the strat-
egy used to handle the prioritized event queue. For instance, assume that the pri-
oritized event queue contains an event arc(H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]A : CP ), coming from
a suspended arc in DAT. If all updated events for A : CP are processed before this
arc (i.e., the fixpoint of A : CP is available before processing the arc), then these
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updated events do not launch any recomputation. Let us define now the notion of
recomputation.
Definition 5.5 (multi-traversed arc)
Let P ∈ Prog , Sα ⊆ AAtom and Ω ∈ QHS . We say that an arc H : CP ⇒ [CP0 ]A :
CP1 in the dependency arc table has been multi-traversed w.r.t. Ω after the analysis
of P for Sα iff it has been introduced in the dependency arc table at least twice as
a non suspended arc w.r.t. Ω.
Example 5.6
Assume that we use a strategy Ω′′ ∈ QHS such that step C in Example 4.2 is per-
formed before B (i.e., the second rule is analyzed before the first one). Then, when
the answer for rectoy(N1, R):〈int, term〉 is looked up, procedure get answer re-
turns ⊥ and thus the processing of arc A2,2 is suspended at this point in the sense
that its continuation A2,3 is not inserted in the queue (see L20 in Algorithm 1).
Indeed, we can proceed with the remaining arc A1,1 which is processed exactly as
in step B. In this case, the updated event U1 is not redundant for Ω
′′, as there
is a suspended dependency introduced by the former processing of arc A2,2 in the
table. Therefore, the processing of U1 introduces the suspended arc A2,2 again in
the queue, and again A2,2 is introduced in the dependency arc table, but now as
not suspended. The important point is that the fact that U1 inserts A2,2 must not
be considered as a reprocessing, since A2,2 had been suspended and its continuation
(A2,3 in this case) had not been handled by the algorithm yet. Hence, finally A2,2
has not been multi-traversed. ✷
We define now the notion of relevant entry, which will be crucial for defining
reduced certificates. The key observation is that those answer patterns whose com-
putation has generated multi-traversed arcs should be available in the certificate.
Definition 5.7 (relevant entry)
Let P ∈ Prog, Sα ⊆ AAtom and Ω ∈ QHS . We say that the entry A : CP 7→ AP
in the answer table is relevant w.r.t. Ω after the analysis of P for Sα iff there exists
a multi-traversed arc ⇒ [ ]A : CP w.r.t. Ω in the dependency arc table.
The notion of reduced certificate allows us to remove irrelevant entries from the
answer table and produce a smaller certificate which can still be validated in one
pass.
Definition 5.8 (reduced certificate)
Let P ∈ Prog , Sα ⊆ AAtom and Ω ∈ QHS . Let FCert = Analyze f(Sα,Ω) for P
and Sα. We define the reduced certificate, RCert, as the set of relevant entries in
FCert w.r.t. Ω.
Example 5.9
From now on, in our running example, we assume the strategy Ω′ ∈ QHS which
assigns the highest priority to redundant updates (see Proposition 5.3). For this
strategy, the entry E′1 ≡ rectoy(N, M) : 〈int, term〉 7→ 〈int, int〉 in Example 4.2 is
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not relevant since no arc has been multi-traversed. Therefore, the reduced certifi-
cate for our running example is empty. In the following section, we show that our
checker is able to reconstruct the fixpoint in a single pass from the empty certifi-
cate. It should be noted that, using Ω as in Example 4.2, the answer is obtained
by performing two analysis iterations over the arc associated to the second rule of
rectoy(N, M) (steps C and D) due to the fact that U1 has been delayed and becomes
relevant for Ω. Thus, this arc has been multi-traversed. ✷
Consider now the Java version of the procedure rectoy, borrowed from (Rose 1998):
int rectoy(int n) {
int m; int r;
m=0;
if (n > 0) {
n= n-1;
r = this.rectoy(n);
m = n + 4;
};
return m; // Program point 30
}
For this program, lightweight bytecode verification (LBV) (Rose 1998) sends, to-
gether with the program, the reduced non-empty certificate cert = ({30 7→ (ǫ, rectoy·
int · int · ⊥)}, ǫ), which states that at program point 30 the stack does not contain
information (first occurrence of ǫ),2 and variables n, m and r have type int, int and
⊥. The need for sending this information is because rectoy, implemented in Java,
contains an if -branch (equivalent to the branching for selecting one of our two
clauses for rectoy). In LBV, cert has to inform the checker that it is possible for
variable r at point 30 to be undefined, if the if condition does not hold. However,
in our method this is not necessary because the checker is able to reproduce this
information itself. Therefore, the above example shows that our approach improves
on state-of-the-art PCC techniques by reducing the certificate even further while
still keeping the checking process one-pass.
5.3 Generation of Certificates without Irrelevant Entries
In this section, we instrument the analyzer of Algorithm 1 with the extensions
necessary for producing reduced certificates, as defined in Definition 5.8. Together
with the answer table returned by Algorithm 1, this new algorithm returns also
the set RED (initially empty) of call patterns which will form finally the reduced
certificate RCert. The resulting analyzer Analyze r is presented in Algorithm 2.
Except for procedure process arc and insert answer info, it uses the same
procedures as Algorithm 1, adapting them to the new syntax of arcs. Now, arcs will
be annotated with an integer value u which counts the number of times that the
2 The second occurrence of ǫ indicates that there are no backward jumps.
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arc has been traversed during the analysis. The first time that an arc is introduced
in the prioritized event queue, it is annotated with 0. Thus, L13 in Algorithm 1
must be replaced by:
13: add event(arc(Ak(0) : CP⇒ [CP0] Bk,1 : CP1),Ω)
Let us see the differences between Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1:
1. We detect all multi-traversed arcs. When a call to process arc is generated,
this procedure checks if the arc is suspended (L13) before introducing the
corresponding arc in the dependency arc table. If the arc is suspended, then
its u value is not modified, since, as explained before, it cannot be considered
as a reprocessing. Otherwise, the u-value is incremented by one. Furthermore,
if Bk,i is not a constraint and u is greater than 1, then Bk,i:CP2 is added
to the RED set, since this means that the arc has been multi-traversed. Note
that the RED set will contain in the end those call patterns whose analysis
launches the recomputation of some arc.
Another important issue is how to handle the continuation of the arc which
is being currently processed. If the arc is suspended, then no continuation
is introduced in the queue (checked by L4 and L9). Otherwise (L4), before
introducing the continuation in the queue, we check if the dependency arc
table already contains such a continuation (L6). In that case, we add the
arc with the same u annotation than that in the queue (L7). Otherwise, we
introduce the continuation as an arc initialized with 0 (L8).
2. We ignore redundant updates. Only non-redundant updates are processed by
procedure insert answer info (L23). Each time an updated event is gener-
ated, we check if DAT |H:CP is different from ∅ (L23). Only then, an updated
event for H :CP is generated (L24).
Example 5.10
Consider the four steps performed in the analysis of our running example. Step
A is identical. In step B the insert answer info procedure detects a redundant
updated event (L23). No updated event is generated. Step C remains identical and
the arc A2,2 (the only one able to contribute to the RED set) is annotated with 1,
and step D does not occur. As expected, upon return, the RED set remains empty.
✷
5.4 Correctness of Certification
This section shows the correctness of the certification process carried out to gen-
erate reduced certificates, based on the correctness of the certification with full
certificates of (Albert et al. 2008). First, note that, except for the control of rel-
evant entries, Analyze f(Sα,Ω) and Analyze r(Sα,Ω) have the same behavior
and thus compute the same answer table.
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Algorithm 2 Analyze r: Analyzer instrumented for Certificate Reduction
1: procedure process arc(Hk(u) : CP0 ⇒ [CP1] Bk,i : CP2 ∈ Dep,Ω ∈ QHS)
2: W := vars(Hk, Bk,1, . . . , Bk,nk );
3: CP3 := get answer(Bk,i : CP2,CP1,W,Ω);
4: if CP3 6= ⊥ and i 6= nk then
5: CP4 := Arestrict(CP3, vars(Bk,i+1));
6: if there exists the arc Hk(w) : ⇒ : Bk,i+1 in
the dependency arc table then
7: add event(arc(Hk(w) : CP0 ⇒ [CP3] Bk,i+1 : CP4),Ω);
8: else add event(arc(Hk(0) : CP0 ⇒ [CP3] Bk,i+1 : CP4),Ω);
9: else if CP3 6= ⊥ and i = nk then
10: AP1 := Arestrict(CP3, vars(Hk));
11: insert answer info(H : CP0 7→ AP1,Ω);
12: if Bk,i is not a constraint then
13: if CP3 = ⊥ then
14: add Hk(u):CP0⇒[CP1] Bk,i:CP2) to dependency arc table;
15: else % non-suspended arc
16: add Hk(u+ 1):CP0⇒[CP1] Bk,i:CP2 to dependency arc table;
17: if u+1>1 then add Bk,i:CP2 to RED;
18: procedure insert answer info(H : CP 7→ AP ∈ Entry ,Ω ∈ QHS)
19: AP0 := lookup answer(H : CP,Ω);
20: AP1 := Alub(AP,AP0);
21: if AP0 6= AP1 then %updated required
22: add answer table(H :CP 7→AP1);
23: if DAT |H :CP 6= ∅ then % non-redundant updated
24: add event(updated(H : CP ));
Proposition 5.11
Let P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Ω,Ω′ ∈ QHS . Let AT be the answer
table computed by Analyze r(Sα,Ω
′). Then, Analyze f(Sα,Ω) = AT .
Proof
First note that except for the u-annotations, the procedures process arc in Al-
gorithms 1 and 2 are similar. In fact, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the definition of both procedures. Concretely, we have the following mapping:
Analyze f Analyze r
L16-L17 L12-17
L18 L2
L19 L3
L20-L22 L4-L8
L23-L24 L9-L11
The only difference between Algorithms 1 and 2 relies on insert answer info. For
the case of Algorithm 2, redundant updates are never introduced in the prioritized
event queue (L23). Then, let us choose a new strategy Ω′′, identical to Ω′ except
when dealing with redundant updates. For redundant updates, let us assume that
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Ω′′ processes them inmediately after being introduced in the event queue. Such pro-
cessing does not generate any effect since the dependency arc table does not contain
arcs to be launched for these updates. Hence it holds that Analyze r(Sα,Ω
′) gen-
erates the same answer table AT than Analyze f(Sα,Ω
′′). From Proposition 5.3
it holds that Analyze f(Sα,Ω)=Analyze f(Sα,Ω
′′) and the claim follows.
The following definition presents the certifier for reduced certificates.
Definition 5.12
We define the function Certifier r: Prog×ADom×2AAtom×APol×QHS 7→ACert ,
which takes P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom, Iα ∈ APol , Ω ∈ QHS . It
returns as certificate, RCert = {A : CP 7→ AP ∈ FCert | A : CP ∈ RED}, where
〈FCert,RED〉 =Analyze r(Sα,Ω), iff FCert ⊑ Iα.
Finally, we can establish the correctness of Certifier r which amounts to say that
RCert contains all relevant entries in FCert.
Theorem 5.13
Let P ∈ Prog, Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom, Iα ∈ APol and Ω ∈ QHS . Let
FCert =Analyze f(Sα,Ω) and RCert= Certifier r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω). Then, an
entry A : CP 7→ AP ∈ FCert is relevant w.r.t. Ω iff A : CP 7→ AP ∈ RCert.
Proof
According to Definition 5.12, RCert = {A : CP 7→ AP ∈ FCert | A : CP ∈ RED},
where 〈FCert,RED〉 =Analyze r(Sα,Ω). Hence, it is enough to prove that an entry
A : CP 7→ AP ∈ FCert is relevant w.r.t. Ω iff A : CP ∈ RED.
(⇐) Assume that A : CP ∈ RED. Then, from L16 and L17 it holds that there exists
an arc H(u) : CP ′⇒[ ]A : CP in the dependency arc table such that u > 1. But
the u-value of an arc can only be increased in procedure process arc (L16) after
checking that CP3 is different from ⊥ (L15). But CP3 is computed by means of
get answer (L3) which calls lookup answer (L27). This last function only
returns a value different from ⊥ if A : CP as an entry in the answer table (L30
and L31). Since u > 1 then u has been incremented at least twice and as argued
before, in both cases the answer table contained an entry for A : CP , i.e., by
Definition 5.5, the arc H : CP ′ ⇒ [ ]A : CP is multi-traversed w.r.t Ω. Hence, by
Definition 5.7, A : CP 7→ AP is a relevant entry.
(⇒) Assume now that the entry A : CP 7→ AP is relevant w.r.t Ω. Then, by
Definition 5.7, there exists an arc H : CP ′ ⇒ [ ]A : CP in the dependency
arc table which has been multi-traversed. By Definition 5.5, this arc has been
introduced in the dependency arc table at least twice as non-suspended arc. But
arcs are introduced in DAT via procedure process arc and each time the arc
is non suspended (L15) its u-value is increased by 1 (L16). Hence the u value for
H : CP ′ ⇒ [ ]A : CP is at least 2. Now, L17 ensures that A : CP ∈ RED.
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6 Checking Reduced Certificates
In the ACC framework for full certificates (Albert et al. 2005) a concrete checking
algorithm is used with a specific graph traversal strategy which we will refer to as
ΩC . This checker has been shown to be very efficient (i.e., this particular ΩC is
a good choice) but here we would like to consider a more generic design for the
checker in which it is parametric on ΩC in addition to being parametric on the
abstract domain.3 This lack of parametricity on ΩC was not an issue in the original
formulation of ACC in (Albert et al. 2005) since there full certificates were used.
Note that even if the certifier uses a strategy ΩA which is different from ΩC , all
valid full certificates are guaranteed to be validated in one pass by that specific
checker, independently of ΩC . This result allowed using a particular strategy in the
checker without loss of generality. However, the same result does not hold any more
in the case of reduced certificates. In particular, completeness of checking is not
guaranteed if ΩA 6= ΩC . This occurs because, though the answer table is identical
for all strategies, the subset of redundant entries depends on the particular strategy
used. The problem is that, if there is an entry A : CP 7→ AP in FCert such that it
is relevant w.r.t. ΩC but it is not w.r.t. ΩA, then a single-pass checker will fail to
validate the RCert generated using ΩA. In this section, we design a generic checker
which is not tied to a particular graph traversal strategy. In practice, upon agreeing
on the appropriate parameters, the consumer uses the particular instance of the
generic checker resulting from the application of such parameters. In a particular
application of our framework, we expect that the graph traversal strategy is agreed
a priori between consumer and producer. Alternatively, if necessary (e.g., when the
consumer does not implement this strategy), the strategy can be sent along with
the certificate in the transmitted package.
It should be noted that the design of generic checkers is also relevant in light of
current trends in verified analyzers (e.g., (Klein and Nipkow 2003; Cachera et al. 2004)),
which could be transferred directly to the checking end. In particular, since the de-
sign of the checking process is generic, it becomes feasible in ACC to use automatic
program transformation techniques (Jones et al. 1993) to specialize a certified (spe-
cific) analysis algorithm in order to obtain a certified checker with the same strategy
while preserving correctness and completeness.
6.1 The Generic Checking Algorithm
The following definition presents a generic checker for validating reduced certifi-
cates. In addition to the genericity issue discussed above, an important difference
with the checker for full certificates (Albert et al. 2005) is that there are certain en-
tries which are not available in the certificate and that we want to reconstruct and
output in checking. The reason for this is that the safety policy has to be tested w.r.t.
the full answer table –Equation (2). Therefore, the checker must reconstruct, from
3 Note that both the analysis and checking algorithms are always parametric on the abstract
domain. This genericity allows proving a wide variety of properties by using the large set of
available abstract domains, this being one of the fundamental advantages of ACC.
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RCert, the answer table returned by Analyze f, FCert, in order to test for adher-
ence to the safety policy –Equation (4). Note that reconstructing the answer table
does not add any additional cost compared to the checker in (Albert et al. 2005),
since the full answer table also has to be created in (Albert et al. 2005).
Algorithm 3 Generic Checker for Reduced Certificates Checking r
1: procedure insert answer info(H :CP7→AP ∈ Entry ,Ω ∈ QHS)
2: AP0 := lookup answer(H :CP,Ω);
3: AP1 := Alub(AP,AP0);
4: (IsIn,AP ′)=look fixpoint(H :CP ,RCert);
5: if IsIn and Alub(AP,AP′) 6= AP ′ then return error; % error of type a)
6: if AP0 6=AP1 then % updated required
7: if IsIn and AP0=⊥ then AP1=AP
′
8: add answer table(H :CP 7→AP1 );
9: if DAT |H :CP 6 =∅ then
10: add event(updated (H :CP ),Ω);
11: function look fixpoint(A:CP ∈ AAtom, RCert ∈ ACert)
12: if ∃ a renaming σ such that σ(A:CP 7→AP)∈ RCert then
13: return (true,σ−1(AP));
14: else return (false,⊥);
Definition 6.1 (checker for reduced certificates)
Function Checking r is defined as function Analyze r with the following modi-
fications:
1. It receives RCert as an additional input parameter.
2. It does not use the set RED and it replaces L17 of Algorithm 2 with:
17: If u+1>1 return error
3. If it fails to produce an answer table, then it issues an error.
4. Function insert answer info is replaced by the new one in Algorithm 3.
Function Checker r takes P ∈ Prog, Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol ,
Ω ∈ QHS , RCert ∈ ACert and returns:
1. error if Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert) for P in Dα returns error.
2. Otherwise it returns FCert=Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert) for P andDα iff FCert ⊑
Iα.
Let us briefly explain the differences between Algorithms 2 and 3. First, the checker
has to detect (and issue) two sources of errors:
a) The answer in the certificate and the one obtained by the checker differ
(L5). This is the traditional error in ACC and means that the certificate
and program at hand do not correspond to each other. The call to function
look fixpoint(H : CP ,RCert) in L4 returns a tuple (IsIn, AP ′) such that:
if H : CP is in RCert, then IsIn is equal to true and AP ′ returns the fixpoint
stored in RCert. Otherwise, IsIn is equal to false and AP ′ is ⊥.
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b) Recomputation is required. This should not occur during checking, i.e., no
arcs must be multi-traversed by the checker (L17). This second type of error
corresponds to situations in which some non-redundant update is needed in
order to obtain an answer (it cannot be obtained in one pass). This is detected
in L17 prior to check that the arc is not suspended (L9) and it has been
traversed before, i.e., its u value is greater than 1. Note that we flag this as an
error because the checker will have to iterate and the description we provided
does not include support for it. In general, however, it is also possible to use
a checker that is capable of iterating. In that case of course the certificates
transmitted can be even smaller than the reduced ones, at the cost of increased
checking time (as well as some additional complexity in the checking code).
This allows supporting different tradeoffs between certificate size, checking
time, and checker code complexity.
The second difference is that the A : CP 7→ AP ′ entries stored in RCert have to be
added to the answer table after finding the first partial answer for A : CP (different
from ⊥), in order to detect errors of type a) above. In particular, L7 and L8 add
the fixpoint AP ′ stored in RCert to the answer table.
Example 6.2
All steps given for the analysis of Example 5.10 are identical in Checker r except
for the detection of possible errors. Errors of type a) are not possible since RCert is
empty. An error of type b) can only be generated because of the u value of arc
A2,2. However note that in step C, this arc is introduced in the queue with u = 0.
After processing the arc, the arc goes to the dependency arc table with u = 1. But
since no updated events are generated, this arc is no longer processed. Hence, the
program is validated in a single pass over the graph. ✷
6.2 Correctness of Checking
In this section we prove the correctness of the checking process, which amounts to
saying that if Checker r does not issue an error when validating a certificate, then
the reconstructed answer table is a fixpoint verifying the given input safety policy.
As a previous step, we prove the following proposition in which we also ensure that
the validation of the certificate is done in one pass.
Proposition 6.3
Let P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol and Ω ∈ QHS . Let FCert=
Certifier f(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω), RCert=Certifier r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω). ThenCheck-
ing r(Sα,Ω,RCert) does not issue an error and it returns FCert. Furthermore, the
validation of FCert does not generate multi-traversed arcs.
Proof
Let us consider first the call:
(∗) Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert)
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For this call, let us prove that (1) it does not issue an error and; (2) it returns FCert
as result.
(1) Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert) does not issue an error.
Errors of type (a) (L5 of Algorithm 3) are not possible since, from Definition 5.12,
RCert ⊆ FCert, where FCert is the answer table computed by Analyze f(Sα,Ω).
The correctness of Algorithm Analyze f(Sα,Ω) (see (Hermenegildo et al. 2000))
avoids this kind of errors.
Errors of type (b) can only occur in L17 of procedure process arc (Algorithm
3), for some arc H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]Bk,i : CP2 . Since we follow the same strategy
Ω in Checking r and Analyze r, then Analyze r(Sα,Ω) introduces Bk,i : CP2
in RED (L17 of Algorithm 2), and thus, Definition 5.12 ensures that Bk,i : CP2 7→
AP ∈ RCert. But this is a contradiction since for all entries in RCert, the first
time that the arc is processed without answer in AT for Bk,i : CP2 , Algorithm 3
(L7 and L8) introduces Bk,i : CP2 7→ AP in AT together with the corresponding
event updated(Bk ,i : CP2 ). So when Ω selects this event, the new event arc(H :
CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]Bk,i : CP2 ) is again introduced in the prioritized event queue. When
this arc is selected by Ω, the arc goes again to DAT . But since Bk,i : CP2 7→
AP ∈ AT , no more events of the form updated(Bk ,i : CP2 ) may occur (L6 of
insert answer info(Bk,i : CP2 ) in Algorithm 3 never holds). Hence, no more
calls to process arc for arc(H : CP0 ⇒ [CP1 ]Bk,i : CP2 ) occur. Then the u-value
for this arc will be at most 1 and no error will be generated.
(2) The call (∗) returns FCert.
The only differences between the call (∗) and the callAnalyze r(Sα,Ω) rely on pro-
cedure insert answer info and L17 of procedure process arc. Since (1) ensures
that no error is issued by (∗), then L5 and L17 of Algorithm 3 are never executed.
Then, it is trivial that (1) computes an answer table AT as result. Furthermore,
since (∗) and Analyze r(Sα,Ω) use the same strategy, the only difference is in the
prioritized event queue since for (∗) no relevant updates will appear in the queue.
Instead of this, the real fixpoints in RCert ⊆ FCert are introduced in AT in L7
and L8 of insert answer info. Except for this fact, Algorithms 2 and 3 behave
identically and thus (∗) computes FCert as result.
Finally, proving that the validation of RCert does not generate multi-traversed
arcs is trivial since, by definition, multi-traversed arcs correspond to arcs in DAT
with the u-value greater than 1. Since the call (∗) does not issue an error, L17 of
Algorithm 3 is never executed, i.e., no arc is multi-traversed.
Corollary 6.4
Let P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol and Ω ∈ QHS . Let
FCert=Certifier f(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω), and RCertΩ=Certifier r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω).
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If Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert), RCert ∈ ACert , does not issue an error, then it re-
turns FCert and RCertΩ ⊆ RCert. Furthermore, the validation of FCert does not
generate multi-traversed arcs.
Proof
Let us prove, by contradiction, that RCertΩ ⊆ RCert. If we assume that RCertΩ 6⊆
RCert, then there exists an entry A : CP 7→ AP ∈ RCertΩ such that A : CP 7→
AP 6∈ RCert. By definition of RCertΩ, A : CP ∈ RED. Hence, L16 of Algorithm 2
ensures that there exists an arc H : CP0 (u) ⇒ [CP1 ]A : CP in DAT with u > 1.
But this is not possible since otherwise the call Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCertΩ) would
issue an error, what is a contradiction by Proposition 6.5.
Now observe that from Proposition 6.5 it holds that Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCertΩ)
returns FCert and the validation of RCertΩ does not generate multi-traversed arcs.
But since RCertΩ ⊆ RCert, then it trivially holds that Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert)
also returns FCert exactly in the same way that Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCertΩ) does,
i.e., without generating multi-traversed arcs.
Theorem 6.5 (correctness)
Let P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol , Ω ∈ QHS and RCert ∈
ACert . Then, if Checker r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω,RCert) does not issue an error and
returns a certificate FCert ∈ ACert , then
• FCert is a fixpoint of P .
• FCert ⊑ Iα;
Proof
If Checker r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω,RCert) does not issue an error then, from Defini-
tion 6.1, it holds that FCert =Checking r(Sα,Ω,RCert) does not issue an error and
FCert ⊑ Iα. From Corollary 6.4. it follows that FCert =Certifier f(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,Ω).
Hence, as Definition 4.3 establishes, FCert is the answer table computed by Ana-
lyze f(Sα,Ω
′). Finally, by the results in (Hermenegildo et al. 2000), FCert is a
fixpoint for P .
6.3 Completeness of Checking
The following theorem (completeness) provides sufficient conditions under which a
checker is guaranteed to validate reduced certificates which are actually valid. In
other words, if a certificate is valid and such conditions hold, then the checker is
guaranteed to validate the certificate. Note that it is not always the case when the
strategy used to generate it and the one used to check it are different.
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Theorem 6.6 (completeness)
Let P ∈ Prog , Dα ∈ ADom, Sα ⊆ AAtom , Iα ∈ APol and ΩA ∈ QHS . Let FCert=
Certifier f(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,ΩA) and RCertΩA=Certifier r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,ΩA). Let
ΩC∈ QHS be such that RCertΩC= Certifier r(P,Dα, Sα, Iα,ΩC) and RCertΩA⊇
RCertΩC . Then, Checker r(P, Dα, Sα,ΩC ,RCertΩA) returns FCert and does not
issue an error.
Proof
We prove it by contradiction. The only cases in which Checker r(P,Dα, Sα,
ΩC ,RCertΩA) issues an error are the following:
• The partial answer AP computed for some calling pattern A : CP (provided in
RCertΩA) leads to Alub(AP,AP
′) 6= AP ′ (L5), where AP ′ is the answer for A : CP ,
i.e., A : CP 7→ AP ′ ∈ RCertΩA . But, RCertΩA ⊆ FCert, i.e., FCert would contain
an incorrect answer for A : CP , which is a contradiction with the assumption that
FCert is a valid certificate for P .
• There exists some arc H : CP ⇒ [CP1 ]B : CP2 which has been traversed more
than once, i.e., its u-value is greater than 1 (L17 in Algorithm 3). Since RCertΩC ⊆
RCertΩA , i.e., RCertΩC contains possibly less entries than RCertΩA , then the call
(∗) in Theorem 6.5 fails also because of such a multi-traversed arc. But this is a
contradiction with (1) in Theorem 6.5.
Consequently, Checker r(P,D, S,ΩC ,RCertΩA) returns an answer table AT . Fi-
nally, by Theorem 6.5, we know that since no error is issued, then Checker r re-
turns FCert.
Obviously, if ΩC = ΩA then the checker is guaranteed to be complete. Addition-
ally, a checker using a different strategy ΩC is also guaranteed to be complete as
long as the certificate reduced w.r.t ΩC is equal to or smaller than the certificate
reduced w.r.t ΩA. Furthermore, if the certificate used is full, the checker is complete
for any strategy. Note that if RCertΩA 6⊇ RCertΩC , Checker r with the strategy
ΩC may fail to validate RCertΩA , which is indeed valid for the program under ΩA.
Example 6.7
Consider the program of Example 3.1, the same abstract domain Dα than in our
running example, and the call pattern Sα = {q(X):〈term〉}: The full certificate com-
puted by Certifier f is FCert = {q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉, p(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉}.
Let us consider two different queue handling strategies ΩA 6= ΩC . Under both strate-
gies, we start the analysis introducing q(X):〈term〉 7→ ⊥ in the answer table and
processing the single rule for q. The arc q(X)(0):〈term〉⇒[{X/term}] p(X):〈term〉
is introduced in the queue and processed afterward. As a result, q(X)(0):〈term〉
⇒[{X/term}] p(X):〈term〉 goes to DAT and event newcall (p(X):〈term〉) is gener-
ated. The processing of this last event adds p(X):〈term〉 7→ ⊥ to the answer ta-
ble. Now, using ΩA, the analyzer processes both rules for p(X) in textual order.
None of the arcs introduced in DAT can issue an error. After traversing the first
rule, answer p(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉 is inferred and non-redundant updated event
updated(p(X):〈term〉) is generated. The analysis of the second rule produces as
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answer 〈int〉 and does not update the entry since Alub({X/real}, {X/int}) re-
turns {X/real}. We process the non-redundant update for p by calling function
add dependent rules. The arc for q stored in the dependency arc table with 0
is launched. When processing this arc, again the arc is introduced in DAT with
u = 1, and the answer q(X):〈term〉 7→ 〈real〉 replaces the old one in the answer
table. Since RED is empty, then RCertΩA is empty.
Assume now that ΩC assigns a higher priority to the second rule of p. In this case,
the answer for p(X):〈term〉 changes from ⊥ to {X/int}, producing a non-redundant
update. Suppose now that the updated event is processed, which launches the arc
for q stored in DAT . If we process such an arc, then it will be introduced again in
DAT , but now with u = 1. Answer q(X):〈term〉 7→ {X/int} is inserted in the answer
table. When the first arc for p is processed, the computed answer is {X/real}. Now,
a new non-redundant updated event is needed. The processing of this update event
launches again the arc for q stored in DAT , whose analysis introduces it in DAT
with u = 2.
Hence RCertΩA is empty but RCertΩC contains the single entry p(X):〈term〉 7→
〈real〉. Thus, Checker r(P, Dα, Sα, ΩC ,RCertΩA) will issue an error (L17) when
trying to validate the program if provided with the empty certificate RCertΩA . On
the contrary, by Theorem 6.6, Checker r(P, Dα, Sα,RCertΩC ,ΩA) returns FCert
and does not issue an error. This justifies the results intuitively shown in Section 3.
✷
7 Discussion and Experimental Evaluation
As we have illustrated throughout the paper, the reduction in the size of the cer-
tificates is directly related to the number of updates (or iterations) performed dur-
ing analysis. Clearly, depending on the “quality” of the graph traversal strategy
used, different instances of the generic analyzer will generate reduced certificates
of different sizes. Significant and successful efforts have been made during recent
years towards improving the efficiency of analysis. The most optimized analyzers
actually aim at reducing the number of updates necessary to reach the final fix-
point (Puebla and Hermenegildo 1996). Interestingly, our framework greatly bene-
fits from all these advances, since the more efficient analysis, the smaller the cor-
responding reduced certificates. We have implemented a generator and a checker
of reduced certificates as an extension of the efficient, highly optimized, state-of-
the-art analysis system available in CiaoPP. Both the analysis and checker use the
optimized depth-first new-calling QHS of (Puebla and Hermenegildo 1996).
In our experiments we study two crucial points for the practicality of our pro-
posal: the size of reduced vs. full certificates (Table 7.1) and the relative effi-
ciency of checking reduced vs. full certificates (Table 7.2). As mentioned before,
the algorithms are parametric w.r.t. the abstract domain. In all our experiments
we use the same implementation of the domain-dependent functions of the shar-
ing+freeness (Muthukumar and Hermenegildo 1991) abstract domain. We have se-
lected this domain because it is highly optimized and also because the information
it infers is very useful for reasoning about instantiation errors, which is a cru-
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Program Source ByteC BC/S FCert RCert F/R R/S
aiakl 1555 3817 2.455 3090 1616 1.912 1.039
bid 4945 10376 2.098 5939 883 6.726 0.179
browse 2589 8492 3.280 1661 941 1.765 0.363
deriv 957 4221 4.411 288 288 1.000 0.301
grammar 1598 3182 1.991 1259 40 31.475 0.025
hanoiapp 1172 2264 1.932 2325 880 2.642 0.751
occur 1367 6919 5.061 1098 666 1.649 0.487
progeom 1619 3570 2.205 2148 40 53.700 0.025
qsortapp 664 1176 1.771 2355 650 3.623 0.979
query 2090 8818 4.219 531 40 13.275 0.019
rdtok 13704 15423 1.125 6533 2659 2.457 0.194
rectoy 154 140 0.909 167 40 4.175 0.260
serialize 987 3801 3.851 1779 1129 1.576 1.144
zebra 2284 5396 2.363 4058 40 101.450 0.018
Overall 2.17 3.35 0.28
Table 1. Size of Reduced and Full Certificates
cial aspect for the safety of logic programs. Furthermore, as mentioned previously,
sharing domains have also been shown to be useful for checking properties of im-
perative programs, including for example information flow characteristics of Java
bytecode (Secci and Spoto 2005; Genaim and Spoto 2005). On the other hand, we
have used ⊤ as call patterns in order to get all possible modes of use of predicate
calls.
The whole system is written in Ciao (Bueno et al. 2009) and the experiments
have been run using version 1.13r5499 with compilation to bytecode on a Pentium
4 (Xeon) at 2 Ghz and with 4 Gb of RAM, running GNU Linux Fedora Core-2
2.6.9.
A relatively wide range of programs has been used as benchmarks. They are the
same ones used in (Hermenegildo et al. 2000; Albert et al. 2005), where they are
described in more detail.
7.1 Size of Reduced Certificates
Table 7.1 shows our experimental results regarding certificate size reduction, coded
in compact (fastread) format, for the different benchmarks. It compares the size
of each reduced certificate to that of the full certificate and to the corresponding
source code for the same program.
The column Source shows the size of the source code and ByteC its corre-
sponding bytecode. To make this comparison fair, in column BC/S we subtract
4180 bytes from the size of the bytecode for each program: the size of the byte-
code for an empty program in this version of Ciao(minimal top-level drivers and
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Program CF CR CF /CR
aiakl 85 86 0.986
bid 46 48 0.959
browse 20 20 0.990
deriv 28 27 1.038
grammar 14 14 1.014
hanoiapp 31 30 1.033
occur 18 20 0.911
progeom 17 16 1.012
qsortapp 24 19 1.290
query 13 14 0.917
rdtok 59 56 1.061
rectoy 8 9 0.909
serialize 27 30 0.875
zebra 125 129 0.969
Overall 0.99
Table 2. Comparison of Checking Times
exception handlers for any executable). The size of the certificates is showed in the
following columns. The columns FCert and RCert contain the size of the full and
reduced certificates, respectively, for each benchmark, and they are compared in the
next column (F/R). Our results show that the reduction in size is quite significant
in all cases. It ranges from 101.45 in zebra (RCert is indeed empty –the minimum
size of an empty certificate is 40 bytes– whereas FCert is 4058) to 1 for deriv (both
certificates have the same size).
The last column (R/S) compares the size of the reduced certificate to the source
code (i.e., the size of the final package to be submitted to the consumer). The
results show the size of the reduced certificate to be very reasonable. It ranges from
0.018 times the size of the source code (for zebra) to 1.144 (in the case of serialize).
Overall, it is 0.28 times the size of the source code. We consider this satisfactory
since in general (C)LP programs are quite compact (up to 10 times more compact
than equivalent imperative programs).
7.2 Checking Time of Reduced Certificates
Table 7.2 presents our experimental results regarding checking time. Execution
times are given in milliseconds and measure runtime. They are computed as the
arithmetic mean of five runs. For each benchmark, columns CF and CR are the
times for executing Checker f and Checker r, respectively. Column CF/CR
compares both checking times. These times show that the efficiency of Checker r
is very similar to that of Checker f in most cases.
The last row (Overall) summarizes the results for the different benchmarks using
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a weighted mean which places more importance on those benchmarks with rela-
tively larger certificates and checking times. We use as weight for each program its
actual checking time. We believe that this weighted mean is more informative than
the arithmetic mean, since, for example, doubling the speed in which a large and
complex program is checked is more relevant than achieving this for small, simple
programs. As mentioned before, the efficiency of the checker for reduced certificates
is very similar to that of Checker f (the overall slowdown is 0.99).
8 Related Work
A detailed comparison of the technique of ACC with related methods can be found
in (Albert et al. 2008). In this section, we focus only on work related to certificate
size reduction in PCC. The common idea in order to compress a certificate in the
PCC scheme is to store only the analysis information which the checker is not able
to reproduce by itself (Leroy 2003). In the field of abstract interpretation, this is
known as fixpoint compression and it is being used in different contexts and tools.
For instance, in the Astre´e analyzer (Cousot et al. 2005) designed to detect runtime
errors in programs written in C, only one abstract element by head of loop is kept
for memory usage purposes. Our solution is an improvement in the sense that some
of these elements many not need to be included in the certificate (i.e., if they are not
relevant). In other words, some loops do not require iteration to reach the fixpoint
and our technique detects this.
With our same purpose of reducing the size of certificates, Necula and Lee (Necula and Lee 1998)
designed a variant of the Edinburgh Logical Framework LF (Harper et al. 1993),
called LFi, in which certificates (or proofs) discard part of the information that is
redundant or that can be easily synthesized. LFi inherits from LF the possibility of
encoding several logics in a natural way but avoiding the high degree of redundancy
proper of the LF representation of proofs. In the producer side, the original certifi-
cate is an LF proof to which a representation algorithm is applied. On the consumer
side, LFi proofs are validated by using a one pass LF type checker which is able
to reconstruct on the fly the missing parts of the proof in one pass. Experimental
results for a concrete implementation reveal an important reduction on the size of
certificates (w.r.t. LF representation proofs) and on the checking time. Although
this work attacks the same problem as ours the underlying techniques used are
clearly different. Furthermore, our certificates may be considered minimal, whereas
in (Necula and Lee 1998), redundant information is still left in the certificates in
order to guarantee a more efficient behaviour of the type checker.
A further step is taken in Oracle-based PCC (Necula and Rahul 2001). This is
a variation of the PCC idea that allows the size of proofs accompanying the code
to adapt to the complexity of the property being checked such that when PCC
is used to verify relatively simple properties such as type safety, the essential in-
formation contained in a proof is significantly smaller than the entire proof. The
proof as an oracle is implemented as a stream of bits aimed at resolving the non-
deterministic interpretation choices. Although the underlying representations and
techniques are different from ours, we share with this work the purpose of reducing
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the size of certificates by providing the checker with the minimal information it
requires to perform a proof and the genericity which allows both techniques to deal
with different kinds of properties beyond types.
The general idea of certificate size reduction has also been deployed in lightweight
bytecode verification (LBV) (Rose 1998; Rose 2003). LBV is a practical PCC ap-
proach to Java Bytecode Verification (Leroy 2003) applied to the KVM (an em-
bedded variant of the JVM). The idea is that the type-based bytecode verification
is split in two phases, where the producer first computes the certificate by means
of a type-based dataflow analyzer and then the consumer simply checks that the
types provided in the code certificate are valid. As in our case, the second phase
can be done in a single, linear pass over the bytecode. However, LBV is limited to
types while ACC generalizes it to arbitrary domains. Also, ACC deals with multi-
variance with the associated accuracy gains (while LBV is monovariant). Regarding
the reduction of certificate size, our work characterizes precisely the minimal infor-
mation that can be sent for a generic algorithm not tied to any particular graph
traversal strategy. While the original notion of certificate in (Rose 1998) includes
the complete entry solution with respect to each basic block, (Rose 2003) reduces
certificates by sending information only for “backward” jumps. As we have seen
through our running example, (Rose 2003) sends information for all such backward
jumps while our proposal carries the reduction further because it includes only the
analysis information of those calls in the analysis graph whose answers have been
updated, including both branching and non-branching instructions. We believe that
our notion of reduced certificate could also be used within Rose’s framework.
As a final remark, the main ideas in ACC showed in Equations 2 and 4 in Sec-
tion 2 have been the basis to build a PCC architecture based on certified abstract
interpretation in (Besson et al. 2006). Therefore, this proposal is built on the ba-
sics of ACC for certificate generation and checking, but relies on a certified checker
specified in Coq (Barras et al. 1997) in order to reduce the trusted computing base.
In contrast to our framework, this work is restricted to safety properties which hold
for all states and, for now, it has only been implemented for a particular abstract
domain.
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